DeSciNYC

DeSciNYC

← Back to videos

DeSciNYC 54 × Palladium

Humanity, Space, and Industrial Civilization

Marko Jukic · New York · November 14, 2026

Watch on YouTube

The talk in one minute

A 60-second edit from the recording, in Marko’s own voice.

Read the transcript

Download transcript (.txt)

Transcript from the recording, lightly edited for readability and spelling. [unclear] marks audio that could not be confidently transcribed. Includes the introductions, lecture, audience Q&A, and closing remarks; post-talk mingling is omitted.

Welcome and DeSciNYC introduction

Michael

0:04Alright, let's go! It's gonna be exciting. Thank you guys all for coming. What an exciting time for y'all to be here. So for those of you that don't know, my name is Michael. I run the DeSciNYC community. This is, believe it or not, I think like the 50th event that we've hosted in New York. But this one is slightly different because... Everyone here is dressed up and looking beautiful.

0:30This is something we've sort of been looking to do for a while, but this was just sort of the time right now. For those of you that don't know, what is decentralized science? What is DeSci? It was originally like a concept in crypto where people tried to use cryptography and tokenomics to blend together science and... Decentralized, community-based science. That sort of shifted a little bit, and now Decentralized Science NYC has become a community that brings together scientists, founders, entrepreneurs, people that are just sort of curious about the world.

1:05We hosted Bryan Johnson, we hosted the Enhanced Games, we hosted people doing genetic editing, but I think the common thread between all of this is people that are just interested and curious in science. And that's why, particularly, we're so proud to partner today with Palladium because Palladium Magazine is one of the few serious publications that sort of brings together questions around civilization, institutions, technology, and the long-term future of humanity.

1:41So, without further ado, I would like to intro Samo Burja. The Editor-in-Chief of Palladium Magazine. Thank you.

Palladium and speaker introduction

Samo Burja

1:55Thank you, Michael. It is a pleasure to be here tonight and partner not just with DeSciNYC in New York, but to have the first official Palladium Magazine talk in New York City. I thank you. Not to flatter the city, but I will say that it is definitely among the top five most intellectual cities in the world. And every city that is intellectual has its own flavor of exploring ideas, of exploring culture, has a unique perspective partially formed by its unique urban geographic and psychic landscape and partially formed by the dominant industries of the city.

2:42Palladium Magazine has the tagline Governance Futurism. I'm often asked what is Governance Futurism. It is governing the future and the future of governance. That need not mean government, though it can. We publish policy papers. It need not mean science fiction as such that we do deal with how technology is fundamentally changing society. Our upcoming issues will deal with the challenges of a new wave of philanthropic power, one perhaps very alien to New York City, emanating from Anthropic and OpenAI, altering U.S. culture and U.S.

3:22politics for the next few decades. It will be followed up by an issue titled Supercomputer, this idea that computation is broken through all limits and barriers and is perhaps the dominant political and social force of our era. You can simplify it. and call it the data center issue. But I'm personally offended by how ugly of a term that is. If people had a marketing sense, they would call them supercomputers still.

3:50Now, why are we talking tonight about space? I think Marko's talk will fully justify itself. But it is the case that humanity is not It is not reckoned with where it can or should live. How it can or should exist. Most visions of the future, as I just sketched out, are predicated on some form of human obsolescence. Tonight, you are in for a treat of a speaker who believes that humans are not [unclear] for that said obsolescence.

4:21Marko Jukic a senior analyst at Bismarck Analysis. That's another company. That's the company I actually founded. So, you know, we work together. We're colleagues. We're friends. I vouch for him without reservation. And think of him as one of the top ten intellectuals in the world today. So, please welcome, Marko Jukic.

Why put space first?

Marko Jukic

4:53Okay, thank you Samo for that wonderful introduction. that's, you know, I hope I can live up to the praise that you offered. Thank you to DeSci for hosting this, and the Society for Ethical Culture, and of course Palladium Magazine. I think I will launch right into it. So, when we think about space, we tend to think of it as an eventual reward for solving our problems here on Earth.

5:21people tend to think of it as a distant, far-off future that will kind of come automatically if we do certain things on Earth. If we just get the government out of the way into free market, or perhaps we have to issue moral perfection and right social wrongs, kind of quit destroying our environment to become a better type of species, someday we'll go to space. The purpose of this lecture is to Argue that this is completely backwards, and that rather than space being the reward for achieving a perfect society on Earth, the only way to achieve a functional, although certainly not a perfect society, is, you know, the only way to impose the discipline on us to achieve a functional society is by pursuing space expansion, and in particular, interstellar space expansion, rather than just interplanetary in the solar system. You know, we can only solve our problems on Earth by putting space first.

The limits of physical possibility

Marko Jukic

6:13So, even at our current peak of technological sophistication and scale, human civilization is infinitesimally small compared to the actual limits of physical possibility in the universe. This is a photograph of the Earth taken from Mars by one of NASA's probes. You know, here we are just as like a speck, and this is, you know, barely one part of this wonderful universe that we live in.

6:38Now, we have this very medieval attitude towards space. We sort of think that we are irrelevant to it, and it is irrelevant to us, much like in the Middle Ages people would sort of look at the firmament as, you know, kind of like angels or even previously the gods lived. But I think this is in many ways a kind of psychological holdover from before we had this kind of scientific and technological tools to figure out that, you know, We can actually go to space.

7:03We have actually been there. It's possible to survive with the right technology, and of course, our earthly habitat depends on many planetary bodies, including the sun and the moon. And, you know, you might not be interested in space per se, but I think space is definitely interested in you. This is the Pingualuit Crater in the northern Canada, in Quebec. It is now a lake.

7:27This is the result of, you know, ancient, I mean, ancient is, you know, understanding a very old asteroid impact. It has a diameter of three kilometers. And actually, there is, you know, we've mapped out craters from many asteroid impacts over the Earth's, the Earth's very long history. The Chicxulub crater that wiped out the dinosaurs 65 million years ago, I believe, has a diameter of 200 kilometers.

7:52So, you know, I think this is a... I think this is a very striking way to say the Earth is kind of scarred with these impacts. I think this is a striking way to say let us dispense with this psychological barrier that we have that keeps us thinking that our world is limited to our planet. Now, if the limits of our planet are not the limits of our world, then where are the true physical limits of our world?

8:25Now, you know, we can actually use our cosmological theories, which are subject to change, but we can use them to try and kind of measure them objectively, right? And we can call this the limit of physical possibility. There are two trillion galaxies in the observable universe with a radius of 46.5 billion light-years. Not all of these are reachable. Only 6% of them are theoretically reachable if we left today at the speed of light. But this is still 120 billion reachable galaxies with a radius of 18 billion light years.

8:58If we just took 1% of those reachable galaxies, we would still be talking about 1 billion galaxies. Our one galaxy of those 1 billion has over 100 billion stars. And of course, we only live on one planet orbiting one of those 100 billion stars in 120 billion galaxies. And this is in terms of space. In terms of time, you know, currently, I mean, we'll have a lot more time than this, but just on Earth, you know, we think it will take one to three billion years for the sun to render the Earth completely uninhabitable.

9:30So that's a lot of space and a lot of time. Where do we stand in relation to these limits of physical possibility? Well, we have not really developed any of the other planetary bodies in our solar system. We have kind of stayed on Earth. Are we harnessing all of the resources available to us on Earth? Global energy consumption per year is roughly 150 petawatt-hours.

9:59You know, we have not really made use of all the fossil fuels and kind of nuclear plants and geothermal power that we could make use of on Earth with our current levels of technology, but actually all of that stuff pales in comparison to the amount of solar energy that we could make use of. So we can kind of just consider that. And currently, 150 petawatt hours is roughly 0.02% of the solar energy reaching the Earth's surface, so this is not even counting solar -powered space.

10:29Which is, you know, 5,000 times less than what we could capture just on the Earth's surface from the Sun without even considering anything else. And in terms of matter, the Earth's crust, which is a thin layer, you know, at the very surface, only makes up around half of a percent to one percent of the Earth's mass, which means that there are 3.4 billion metric tons of matter in the Earth's crust for every living person today.

10:54So for a frame of reference, Every year, globally, we mine 2.6 billion metric tons just of iron ore every year. So, you know, that is a lot of matter and a lot of energy that we are not even making use of on Earth. This is the luxury superyacht Azzam, which was built for the ruler of Abu Dhabi. It is the longest yacht in the world. It costs $600 million to make, and it features 18 suites for 36 guests, 30 staff, crew cabins for 60 to 80 people, and it has a helipad.

11:26It weighs 14,000 metric tons. If we wanted to give every single one of 8 billion people on planet Earth this exact yacht so that they could live lives of unbelievable luxury, we would only need to use the equivalent of 0.0004% of the mass of the Earth's crust, of the Earth's crust mass. We would actually run out of surface area on the Earth first.

11:53So this perhaps explains why, you know, perhaps contrary to the kind of folk theories that we run out of various minerals and resources on the earth, what actually tends to happen is that we continuously find more deposits of rare earths, or lithium, or uranium, or coal, gas, oil, copper, whatever, because simply the scale of the earth is actually, you know, earth could easily support the civilization, ten times more matter and energy hungry than the current one that we have.

12:22It could actually support a civilization 100 times more matter and energy hungry than the one we have today. And we could even do this without the waste heat of industry on the Earth cooking the planet if we managed carbon emissions, which we, of course, could do. So we are nowhere near the hard physical limits of possibility, even just of the Earth in terms of overpopulation or resource depletion or environmental catastrophe.

Energy, population, and industrial stagnation

Marko Jukic

12:46But despite this, I think we are already stagnating. Here's a chart of... Energy use per person in several countries in the developed world. Energy is like, you know, one of these most basic inputs for industrial development. And if you look at the charts, you can see U.S. total energy consumption actually peaked in 2007 and has been pretty much flat since then. This is at this point 20 years ago.

13:13Japan peaked in 2005, even earlier. Germany in 1979, which at this point is like a lifetime ago. And even U.S. per capita energy consumption. It's down roughly 20% since 1979 when it peaked. And another basic input of industrial development is the number of people, which contributes obviously to, you know, the pool of cognitive and physical labor that we can make use of.

13:38And, you know, I'm sure this is well known at this point, but birth rates have been declining in the entire developed world for, at this point, you know, multiple generations. And, you know, this is just a leading indicator actually for the decline in population. Which, you know, many people might be familiar with when it comes to Japan. Japan's population peaked some 15 years ago, and it's slowly declining, which is giving them kind of economic problems.

13:59The same is pretty much true of every developed country. It's just that some of them have been more welcoming of mass immigration, which has, you know, flattened and softened the numbers. But below, you kind of have the same dynamic of the population slowly declining. This is the asteroid 16 Psyche. By some estimates, it has 10 quintillion dollars worth of nickel and iron inside of it. This is 400,000 times the annual GDP of the United States. And basically, I do not really believe that anyone has any concrete idea what we would build if we were able to capture and use this asteroid. If we converted 16 Psyche into super yachts, we would have 1.6 trillion super yachts.

14:45And there is literally not enough surface area on 12 planet Earths to store all those superyachts. So, the point of this is, since we are nowhere near any hard physical constraints, our industrial stagnation could not be externally imposed, but it must be internally imposed in some way by ourselves.

Human agency and the promise of AI

Marko Jukic

15:07So, I got a good reaction from this slide in San Francisco and a more muted reaction in Washington. I wonder [unclear]. This is the, for those who don't know, this is the starting screen of the game Civilization II, wherein the player builds a civilization, and you begin kind of just with this one unit called a settler who builds your first city, which will build all of your subsequent units as you expand through the game. And most of the screen is black because when you begin the game, you don't know what's around. You're kind of in the dark, and you have to go out and discover and explore what is in the world around you and what you can build in it. So the reason I have this slide is to say, from the perspective of the universe, this is us.

15:49We have only just turned on the game, we have barely made any moves, or perhaps none at all, and we are already deciding to quit. Some people see the smallness of humanity as evidence of our irrelevance compared to the universe. But I would say we have to be careful, because it is not smallness that makes us irrelevant, it is giving up that makes us irrelevant.

16:10Another way to put this, Nobody believes that if we built an artificial superintelligence that it would choose to stay confined just to planet Earth. We all kind of instinctually imagine that it would take over all the resources of the Earth and then naturally expand throughout the universe and, you know, kind of devour the light cone, if you will, in its quest for more matter and energy to achieve its goals, right?

16:33And the reality is we are projecting our own agency to pursue such great achievements onto the AI. And, you know, this is perhaps because we think AI will in some way be superior to humanity, which is a whole separate argument. But to know if AI is superior to humanity when it comes to technological and industrial development, we first have to define what actually is the role of the human being in the development of industry.

16:59And, you know, sort of because industry must develop for humanity or AI to go to space. We have to figure out what our ultimate niche is before we can check whether we fall short compared to the AI.

Human labor, tools, and social technology

Marko Jukic

17:14This is a stem cell. Stem cells are the unspecialized cells found in embryonic tissue and bone marrow. And, you know, the stem cells become other cells. They can become skin cells, muscle cells, whatever types of cells are necessary in the human body, or they can be used to repair other cells. I would analogize the role of humanity and a human being and human labor in the development of industry and technology to the role of a stem cell in the human body.

17:41The human being's role and economic [unclear] within the industrial economy is as a source of unspecialized, adaptable, low-cost, and ultimately extremely robust labor that can create new automated processes from which we derive wealth. Why is Homo sapiens the apex predator on Earth above all other animals? The standard answer you'll get is intelligence, and I'll go further and say there are two particular aspects or expressions of intelligence that we need to consider.

18:11Those are sociality and tool-making. Sociality is our ability to communicate and coordinate with other human beings. You know, no man is an island. As long as there is more than one human being in the world, it is almost kind of inevitable that we will have to deal with one another. And toolmaking is our ability to create technology to mold the inert matter and energy of the world around us in ways that serve our needs or our preferences, right?

18:35And I would say these two things are actually, in another way, also expressions of the same thing, which is the ability to create not artificial intelligence per se, but artificial stupidity in the form of a, you know, kind of predictable, standardized, simplified, and automated processes. That reduce complexity in the world, either in the social or the material world, to be more manageable by an individual person whose bandwidth or complexity is limited. And this is how we increase the capabilities of any one person, right?

19:11So material technology kind of takes the, you know, chaos and complexity of the natural world and turns it into these rigid mechanisms. And when you look at the ways that human beings coordinate throughout history, we actually do a kind of similar thing where we use what... What we would call social technology in the form of law, education, marriage, social norms, cities, awards, rituals, these kinds of concepts that help us interact with each other in automated, habituated ways. And of course, the basic unit of society is the organization, which itself comes with a very rich heritage of different techniques to get people to coordinate and do the same things over and over again so that someone can derive some use from it, right?

19:55Whether those are governments, companies, religions, militaries, non -profits, they all kind of follow the same principles ultimately. And so, you know, material technology automates matter and energy. Social technology automates people through habit and, you know, kind of the constriction of their behavior, if you will. And so, another interesting implication of this is that, really, all material technology is also social technology. Because without the organizations of people necessary to, you know, kind of, let's say, you know, Technology without organizations is just a blueprint, and a blueprint is just a dead letter.

20:40If you want to have actual physical products, you need to have many companies, research institutes, and organizations using many, many people who follow certain processes to manifest this technology in the real world, right? And so behind every technological product, you actually also have a very interesting social organization and the social technology that allows to function. So, these are both forms of automation.

21:07The first iteration of any automated process is always the least efficient. It's the most messy, it's the most rudimentary, it's the most risky, and it's the most demanding of this kind of unautomated, unspecialized human labor, right? Human attention and labor. And what happens is you sort of go through more and more iterations of automating either matter or people. Each subsequent iteration reduces the marginal need for human labor.

21:34As it becomes more efficient, you figure out more problems, you know, you kind of, you kind of, you know, iron out the kinks of whatever you're doing. To give an example, you know, the first prototype of an invention is going to be created by a, you know, you can imagine an inventor working in his garage, maybe spending decades with different techniques and materials.

21:56And then eventually, if he creates a successful invention, eventually you have automated factories cranking out many variations of this, you know, what was once this prototype. You have automated distribution networks, so on and so forth. And in terms of social technology, you could also think, You know, kind of the first customer of any startup or company is always the most difficult to get. It requires a lot of, you know, shall we say, high -touch kind of sales and marketing and persuasion. But the millionth customer of a company is going to be someone that the founder of the company, you know, would be very unlikely to meet.

22:32Kind of a faceless corporation at that point. Excuse me. A faceless corporation that has many of its own automated kind of advertising, marketing departments, and so on and so forth, right? And so what's happening here is that we reduce the marginal need for more attention and labor from the original kind of human designer of the process. And by doing so, we free up this human attention and labor and at the same time create wealth and capabilities from the power of automation and artificial stupidity.

23:02And a key point that's also, you know, very relevant. is that we can never reduce the need for human labor to exactly zero because we have randomness, entropy, and unforeseen circumstances in this universe which will sooner or later destroy any artificially stupid automated process because they are artificially stupid and fragile. And you need the human labor to kind of go around constantly and review, maintain, reform, or even create new automated processes, otherwise everything kind of slowly decays into non-functionality, whether in technological or in social terms.

23:43So that was very theoretical, but I'm not describing something that's abstract or theoretical. We can see the results of this process on the face of the earth. As our industry develops, as we build cities, as we build towns, as we build infrastructure, all of these things are the evidence of these kinds of automated processes being put into action by many individual human designers.

24:04And as they do this, they come to depend on each other in many different ways that are often very unpredictable. So stem cells come together with a human body, and I would say human beings come together in what we could call, at this point, industrial civilization.

Automation as an amplifier of human capabilities

Marko Jukic

24:21So the reason I'm covering all this is because when we talk about automation and increasingly AI, which is, of course, a form of automation, we always talk about it in terms of replacing human labor. But according to our logic, automation is not exactly a replacement for human labor, but an amplifier or a force multiplier of human labor. The greatest period of automation and mechanization in history was the Industrial Revolution from roughly 1800 to 1900.

24:54You can, you know, extend those dates a little bit in either direction if you want. And this period did not see rising mechanization and automation reduce the population. In fact, it saw quite the opposite. You had exploding populations at the same time you had exploding mechanization. And I would argue that there is really no contradiction in this precisely because Man and machine are both things that can be automated by human designers to increase capabilities.

25:22So human labor versus automation is a true dichotomy at the level of any individual process, but it is not the true dichotomy when you look at the sort of collective effort of human civilization as a whole, because when you look at that collective effort, you see we are nowhere near the limits of physical possibility, and the human labor can be redeployed to new processes.

25:44So we expect AI to replace human beings on some level, but the physical architecture of AI is radically different from the physical architecture of human beings. AI is, in fact, you know, it depends on high-end semiconductors, and these semiconductors are the fragile pinnacle of global industrial civilization with billions of human beings working extremely hard across multiple continents. To kind of, you know, make it possible for these chips and various, I mean, you know, the chips are just one of 5,000 components you need in a data center.

26:20Kind of, you know, it's this intelligent thing that really has this massive, massive pyramid of human beings working hard in these automated processes to allow it to exist, right? And if you look at a human being in comparison, a human being is almost super robust, independent, and comparatively low cost and has very few needs in terms of what they need to function at a sort of similar level of capability.

26:47So I would say if AI ultimately falls even slightly short, not just of this kind of raw peak intelligence that you can achieve when you have a global civilization producing chips, But also in all of the different capabilities and attributes that human beings have in terms of robustness and kind of autonomy and independence. because these are the things that allow us to perform the role of unspecialized and adaptable labor that can go around at relatively low cost compared to a data center and review various processes.

27:21I think if it falls even slightly short, we will still preserve the niche for human labor in the industrial economies. We will not achieve this 100.0% automated economy where we've replaced all human beings with AI. we might reach, you know, 99.999%, and we can continue adding nines. And what this will do, basically, is not replace humanity collectively, but it can asymptotically approach human capabilities and only multiply our power to sort of, you know, many and many more orders of magnitude that are currently unimaginable to us. And that is kind of exactly what has happened when you compare us and the capabilities we have with our level of technology to cavemen and their levels of capability with the technology that they had, right?

28:08And what it will do ultimately, you know, it will move us closer to the limits of physical possibility in space, because these are not abstract, these are very tangible processes that have to happen, and, you know, the Earth is, in fact, limited, but the universe is, you know, perhaps not even limited, but certainly much further away than the limits of the Earth are, right?

28:32And, you know, where we will end up, it's very difficult to say. But we will have to outgrow our planet and our solar system and perhaps eventually our galaxy and maybe even many galaxies if you kind of follow this logic to its logical conclusion. So one point I would also like to make, it's a common to call global civilization or global capitalism, kind of the sum total of human beings automating different processes in interdependent ways. It's common to call the collectively intelligent.

29:03But I think it's important to remember that this is a somewhat lousy metaphor because it is not collectively intelligent. It is actually profoundly dumb. It only appears intelligent because of the tireless efforts of individual human designers who are intelligent, who go around constantly repairing processes before they can cause too much damage or even after they've caused a lot of damage. And so if the designers, these kind of life players who go around fixing organizations...

29:31If they stop working, then these profoundly dumb systems are fragile, and sooner or earlier they collapse. And we've seen this happen before in history with the falls of various civilizations.

The visions of the space pioneers

Marko Jukic

29:42And another point I would make is that, in fact, if we look at the progress of space technology and rocketry, we can identify really a handful of visionary engineers, scientists, and artists. Who are up to this point almost totally responsible for all the progress we have made in space technology so far. And these men, although there are economic and military uses for space technology, they were not actually motivated by the economic or military uses of rockets and satellites and so on.

30:16They were motivated by a kind of mystical, spiritual vision of how humanity could reconceptualize itself and what our anthropological destiny would be once we went out into space and saw what would become of us and what we would discover here. So the three that I have on the screen here. These are the three men who independently discovered the rocket equation describing how a rocket can escape the Earth's gravity.

30:40The first was in Russia, Konstantin Tsiolkovsky in 1903, Robert Goddard, American in 1912, and the German Hermann Oberth in 1920. Goddard was a bit of a recluse for better or worse. But Oberth and Tsiolkovsky weren't just scientists. They were also kind of popularizers and writers and advocates and sort of philosophers trying to bring this new vision of leaving planet Earth and going to other planets throughout space kind of to the masses and to promote this new technology that they would also want to work on. And, you know, among these, this was like mostly in the 1920s, and among the enthusiasts and students of Tsiolkovsky and Oberth were two other very important men.

31:24In Russia, Sergei Korolev who eventually was in charge of the Soviet space program and put the first man in space, and Wernher von Braun, who was eventually in charge of NASA and put the first man on the Moon. So in their own words, virtually all of the civilian experimenters and promoters were much more interested in what the rocket could do, theoretically at least, to further their dreams of visiting the moon and other planets than in rocketry itself.

31:51So you have to imagine this is like the 1920s or the 1930s in Berlin, and you would get a bunch of French, you know, a bunch of French rocketeers, German rocketeers, British, American, Russian rocketeers, and they would all get together in Germany somewhere, and they would attach a big rocket to a car and see how fast it could go. And this was kind of the, like, basic R&D that they were, you know, doing in the 20s and the 30s that would eventually lead to real rockets, I mean, more powerful rockets that could go out of space.

32:19Tsiolkovsky famously said that he only studied rocketry to assist his philosophical research, so I'd like to give you, you know, he basically saw no difference between the two, so I'd like to give you a taste of what kind of strange visions he had for humanity. In 1926, he published a 16-point plan for space exploration, which starts off pretty normal, you know, which we think today, sort of design of rocket-propelled airplanes with wings makes sense.

32:45Progressively increasing the speeds and altitudes, yeah, that makes sense. But it kind of goes, you know, it goes on and on, and by the end he says, achievements of individual and social perfection. Overcrowding of the solar system and galaxy colonization, the sun begins to die, and the people remaining in the solar system's population move to other solar systems. So it's worth mentioning at this point that...

33:11You know, Tsiolkovsky had a kind of, you know, he had a kind of different vision of what humanity living in space would be like than we might have today. He kind of saw life without gravity as an important thing. He sort of thought that gravity was inhibiting the potential of life forms to develop in new and interesting ways, and he thought there would really be no need to go to other star systems.

33:33Once you went to space, we would simply live without gravity in artificial habitats until we populated, you know. Populated just this solar system with trillions of people, and we would just stay there until the sun died, right? So sort of a Soviet, early Soviet communist vision of space, you know, Tsiolkovsky dedicated his, he dedicated his estate to the USSR when he died.

33:54You know, this vision has been somewhat lost, but, you know, I think it's very illustrative of the range of ideas that people had. The Germans had their own ideas back then. So there's like this sort of [unclear] phase. The story I like to tell. In 1924, Hermann Oberth had already written a scientific book explaining how we could use rockets to get to space, but he realized that very few people had read this book because they didn't understand the equations, so he decided he had to write a popular work sort of explaining that we could go to space and all the fun things we could do there in the hopes that he could raise enough money to build a rocket.

34:29And so he was sort of writing a letter to his friend, Max Valier, describing the topics he would like to cover in this book that would popularize space exploration. And the topics he wants to include were rocket physics, okay, the habitability of our planets, all very normal, is there a soul, the enigma of the universe, mechanical effects for the phenomenon of consciousness, pretty interesting, telepathy, why do all religions locate the sleep of the good angels up above, the fiasco of the religions of revelation, alright.

35:04And parapsychologic experiments beyond the atmosphere of the Earth. So, Max Valier wisely advised Hermann Oberth not to include any of these topics in his book, which he did. But this is for purely tactical PR reasons. Because Max Valier actually had an even crazier theory that he wanted attest with rocketry. He believed in what was called the World Ice Theory, or World Ice Doctrine, which was invented by this guy over here in the late 19th century, which hypothesized that the entire universe outside of Earth was made of ice, and that icy asteroids would periodically crash into the Earth deeply affecting human history, such as through the Biblical Flood or the fall of Atlantis.

35:49So, you know, source, I made it up. But this was, you know, according to Max Valier, it meant for him a new vision of the world and a new philosophy of life. And he was interested in rocketry so we could test whether the Moon was made of ice and if we could confirm this theory or not. So these are some of the kookier things that motivated them.

36:10But I think, you know, Wernher von Braun perhaps ultimately had a vision of space that's more in line with what you might think today. He sort of thought that, you know, Oh, I should mention, Tsiolkovsky thought that there would be aliens out in the universe smarter than us, Oberth believed that there were not, because given the rarity of intelligent life on Earth compared to, you know, there's us and there's the animals, he thought it would be the same situation in space. Wernher von Braun thought that we would be aliens out in the universe, but they didn't.

36:41That they would kind of be, in a way, human, and that they would worship kind of the same God as us, and kind of have the same metaphysics and philosophy and principles of life as us. And he saw going to space as a way to perhaps kind of meet our long-lost brothers across the universe, our long-lost brothers and sisters who, you know, we have been kind of separated from for all of his time.

37:02And, you know, he had a sort of religious conviction about this. He worked with Walt Disney to popularize space in the 1950s, so maybe, you know, this was partially something calculated to appeal to 1950s America, which was very Christian. But, you know, all of these crazy visions, I think it's important to emphasize, were not idle dreams. They did, in fact, build the rockets.

37:25They did, in fact, put men on the moon. They did in fact send probes across the solar system and past the solar system, and they built the intercontinental ballistic missiles, which form the basis of military and geopolitical power to the present day. You know, nuclear bombs cannot get very far without rockets, and this might make rockets perhaps literally the most consequential and most powerful technology still to this day that has ever been developed. Maybe when we develop AI a little bit more, AI will take the crown from these guys.

37:59And so what I want to emphasize as well is that we are talking here literally about one single generation of men who were active over their careers from the 1920s when they were, you know, kind of shooting rocket cars and reading Tsiolkovsky and Oberth, all the way to the 1960s when they were building intercontinental ballistic missiles for the US and the Soviet Union. It was always just the same generation of a handful of people.

38:23And Korolev died in 1966. He basically had health problems. Von Braun retired from NASA in 1972. And the last time we had men on the moon was in 1972, which at this point was 54 years ago, more than half a century, perhaps even like two generations, depending on how you want to count it. And basically, as soon as these kind of visionary engineers with these mystical visions, as soon as they died or retired, Space progress kind of ground to a complete halt until 50 years later, we got some new crazy engineers with crazy visions who could pick up the torch and continue driving progress and rocketry through new ways.

39:03So, you know, here we have Elon Musk and Jeff Bezos who are probably in charge of the first and second most advanced rocket companies in the world today. Elon Musk has many times said that he's inspired by not just the idea of building a colony on Mars, but of spreading the, quote, light of consciousness throughout the universe and discovering the secrets of the universe that we cannot, you know, perhaps cannot discover from the small position that we occupy as a civilization now.

39:29Jeff Bezos has also a different vision, you know, maybe more of a kind of Tsiolkovsky-inspired vision. He thinks that we should turn the Earth into a nature park and move all of the human beings and the industry into the vacuum of space, where it can't pollute the Earth. And then we can, you know, sort of also like Tsiolkovsky imagined, have trillions of human beings living in the solar system and have thousands of Mozarts and Einsteins as we kind of, you know, increase the size of civilization, not necessarily on the planet and not necessarily across the galaxy, but in the solar system.

40:01So the space pioneers kind of understood that our anthropological destiny, what it means to be human, would ultimately depend on what we discovered in space and how human civilization would change us as we went into space. Sort of in the same way, you can kind of imagine how a king of man in the Stone Age envisioned his role in nature and the kind of great chain of being was very different from how a peasant in, you know, an agricultural society viewed their role in the world compared to how we viewed ourselves and our roles in the world in the industrial era, and perhaps today when we have a lot of transhumanists or other different kinds of visions. All these visions are very different.

40:37And what they were trying to do with rocketry was to update and reconcile you know, our understanding of humanity in light of the kind of revelation of space that we had in the 20th century, you know, at the beginning of the 20th century, it was still an open question whether there were Martians living on Mars, right? This was like not known. We didn't have the telescopes. We didn't have the kind of science or the probes. And of course, if there were Martians living on Mars, I think history would have gone very differently since we discovered them.

41:08And, you know, it turns out there weren't any Martians on Mars. And strangely, you know, The one giant leap for mankind that Neil Armstrong took when he stepped on the moon. Today we look at it as this kind of final culmination of the achievements of civilization, when at the time it was intended to be a stepping stone and the beginning of something new and great.

41:28And so, you know, that never happened, obviously. And von Braun, you know, when he was being congratulated for taking men to the moon, he had already, you know, he had already drafted plans. For a mission to Mars in 1981, which was [unclear], but he admitted himself that he was not able to justify to Congress why we would need to go to Mars, why we would need to spend that money.

Political limits and institutional succession

Marko Jukic

41:56So, why did we stop developing prematurely, I would say, in the middle of the 20th century? There is a story from Petronius that says a Roman inventor came to Emperor Tiberius Caesar a long time ago. And showed him a new kind of glass, this kind of flexible glass, that would dent and bend when you dropped it rather than shatter. And Emperor Tiberius asked him, is there anybody else who knows the secret of this wonderful new technology besides you?

42:28The inventor proudly told him, no, just me. And the emperor promptly had him beheaded on the spot. So we don't really know why, what the rationale was for beheading the inventor. This is kind of an apocryphal story. But various interpretations are that he wanted to preserve kind of the gold and silver industries, he wanted to preserve the interests of the legacy glassmaking industry and prevent it from being disrupted, and the Roman economy kind of itself being disrupted as a result.

42:56The point of the story is that it is possible for political choices to halt economic development, which is ultimately technological development. Did we perhaps do something similar? This is a quote. Sorry, can I get a little bit of light? I can't. Okay, perfect. Thank you. Anyway, sorry. This is a thorny question to answer, but I think we have some clues. For one, in the 20th century, we for the first time explicitly limited the development of technology and industry sort of on the justifications of limiting the danger of humanity to itself and to the natural environment.

43:37In 1970, we got the Environmental Protection Agency, which began heavily regulating the chemicals industry. In 1972, and around that time, we started having these ballistic missile limitation treaties with the Soviet Union because we were worried about building, you know, arsenals of nuclear weapons that were too large and would kind of wipe out civilization. But obviously, this also reduces the demand for rockets for other purposes.

44:02In 1973, the Federal Aviation Administration banned the flight of supersonic jets over land, which kind of killed the supersonic flight industry because it would have needed the U.S. market to be profitable. In 1974, we got the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, which began heavily regulating nuclear power and pretty much drove the entire industry to a halt for decades. In 1979, the acronym NIMBY, not in my backyard, first appeared in print, and we started kind of having activist energy against any construction in general.

44:34In 1990, we got our first carbon tax in Finland, and we have since gotten many more taxes and restrictions on the use of hydrocarbons, which still in many ways are the lifeblood of the global economy. And I don't want to give the impression that this is necessarily something that began in the 16th and 17th, because one of the first instances of this was actually from 1922, when you had the Washington Naval Treaty, the Washington Naval Treaty was signed between the world's great powers that actually limited the tonnage and the size of battleships and aircraft carriers, which kind of sounds funny to us today, because who's afraid of some battleships or aircraft carriers, but at the time these were seen as the most destructive weapons.

45:11That an empire could have. And even then, they were trying to limit these. And in 1938, for the first time, we got the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, which I believe technically founded the FDA. In the U.S. at least, the government first began regulating what kinds of substances you could sell to other people to put into your bodies, which is in many ways the beginning of regulation on pharmaceuticals and biotechnology.

45:36And, you know, when you look at this list of technologies, this is like a pretty comprehensive list of advanced technologies. And notably, one of the technologies that is notably missing from this list is computers. And if you look at how much computers have advanced since the 1960s and the 1970s to the present day, it makes you wonder. And of course, computers, now that we see how powerful they have become, are something else we're considering regulating in the form of AI.

46:02Another clue, when you see an explosion in the capabilities of material technology, as we saw from, say, 1800 to 1950, what happens is, You can actually increase the capabilities of your social technology as well, or in this particular instance, in the capabilities of the organizations you build. So by sort of World War II, Cold War era, it was possible for the first time in history to have governments that were so powerful that they could command not just one region or one large country, or kind of vaguely control a continental empire like the Roman Empire. You for the first time had governments that could command.

46:43Multiple continents, millions or hundreds of millions of people, and do so with kind of... You know, much closer surveillance and control. You, for the first time, had radio and television, which allowed you to kind of have mass communication and spread political messages very widely and quickly. You had new technologies, you know, kind of for external coercion, you know, in terms of military power.

47:05You had machine guns, then you got air forces, you had huge battleships, of course, and eventually you got ICBMs, which make a government capable of striking any target on the planet, basically, arbitrarily. And so, what happens with institutions is that when the initial human designer builds them, when they build this organization, this instance of social technology, they're presumably building something that is very valuable. And unfortunately, when you build something valuable, you want to include mechanisms that prevent other people from taking control of it from you, right? And unfortunately, the same mechanisms that prevent...

47:42Your contemporary competitors from seizing control of your organization, those are the same mechanisms that prevent anybody after you, after you die, after you retire, they're the same mechanisms that prevent anybody else from fixing or reforming your organization as it slowly decays, as this kind of automated process, as circumstances change, and you get what is called succession failure, where you have an initial founder of an organization who is fully capable of kind of controlling it in the way he wants and getting the results that the organization was built for and designed for. Eventually you have people who are not really capable of controlling the whole organization, and everybody in the organization sort of pursues their own local incentives and goals, and the organization slowly and slowly becomes more and more dysfunctional.

48:25Now what happens when you have organizations capable of exerting power and influence and control over the entire globe? Well, eventually if you have succession failures in those kinds of organizations, you're going to have global dysfunction that cannot really be escaped. And I think in the modern day, we sort of feel trapped and helpless against these Leviathan organizations. There's this feeling that you cannot really change the system, you cannot really escape the system. And I think it's not just a feeling, it's literally true.

48:57And perhaps one of the problems is that kind of the vision of space expansion and exploration was related to a technology that perhaps just came a little bit too late before we built these kind of continental global scale institutions, which were built mostly in the 1930s and 1940s, where space kind of came 20 years later, which was perhaps already too late.

Growth, fertility, and the future of industry

Marko Jukic

49:21And so I think when you look at this regulation and this succession failure, we have internally imposed limits on further industrial and technological development. And going back to our kind of theory of automation from earlier, when you insert these limits, you end up with a fixed pie of necessary work and processes that need to be carried out, rather than this open-ended process of civilization that can expand further and further to the limits of physical possibility.

49:54And when you have this fixed pie that you have artificially limited, each iteration can be more efficient. And as you make each iteration more efficient, you reduce the need for human labor. And when you reduce the need for human labor, well, do you really need more people anymore? What happens if the body no longer needs stem cells? So in 1968, a famous book called The Population Bomb came out, arguing that human population growth was on an exponential trend, And an exponential trend on a limited planet would eventually result in catastrophic overpopulation and famine, and therefore, we had to urgently take measures for population control.

50:37In 1972, a similar book, or I should say, a book with similar arguments called The Limits to Growth [unclear]. This book was not arguing that exponential population growth would lead to disaster. But a function of population growth in the form of economic growth would lead to disaster because the world is limited in terms of resources and you cannot have exponential growth on a single planet with limited resources without also risking disaster and environmental catastrophe.

51:03And these books were very influential. They directly led to things. In 1975, India began its first mass sterilization campaigns. This is some history people tend not to know about, but they kind of actively wanted to limit their population growth back then. And China famously instituted the one-child policy in 1979, kind of based on the same arguments, hoping that limiting population growth would actually help their economic development.

51:28So, you know, did we do something similar? Here's a chart of the effective fertility rate, which is different from the total fertility rate in that this measures the number of children that survive to reproductive age rather than the number of children that are born at all. And if you look at this chart, in 1960, every one of these developed countries was above effective replacement fertility of 2.1.

51:55And between 1960 and 1977, by 1977, every single one of them was below replacement, many of them for the first time in history. And if you look at this chart, which goes back to 1751, you can see this is an extremely, extremely steep drop, right? So I would say, I think we also decided we didn't really need people. For many of the same reasons, we decided we didn't need further technological development or industrial development in the machines that would come out of that, because we just didn't need them anymore.

52:29And I would like to point out as well, or underline, the sort of theories of exponential growth on one limited planet leading to disaster are true in a sense, but make the catastrophic mistake of ignoring the rest of the universe in which we can expand. And if you take the limit of physical possibility of the universe rather than the limit of the earth, for which there is not really any good reason to, then we are capable of many, many, many more orders of magnitude of industrial and economic and technological growth before we hit anything like a hard limit that would lead to catastrophe.

53:05So, what happens when you limit technological, industrial development, but you are not capable of reforming your institutions to kind of, you know, work with this new fact? The institutions you've built are older, and they expect and rely and depend on at least the illusion of continued economic growth. You kind of incentivize, you know, you kind of incentivize this, you incentivize this fake-job kind of economy.

53:37You've basically created the first generation of human beings, when the pie finally gets fixed, actually are superfluous and in a way are able to enjoy this one-time boost of leisure. You could even say perhaps this was kind of the experience of the baby boomer generation, beginning in the 60s and the 70s, but at the same time, you create the demand for these Fake jobs to give the illusion of economic activity.

54:08Government jobs are kind of an easy target, but there's a lot of fraud and waste and kind of, you know, unnecessarily complicated activity going on throughout all sectors of the economy and kind of the corporate world. You know, real leisure plus demand for fake jobs incentivizes fraud and fake economic activity to capture more wealth in the short term. And an interesting fact is that The collapse of fertility rates is not just occurring in the developed world anymore, but also in the developing world, which seems to fly in the face of, you know, kind of a lot of people would have this folk theory that the reason we have falling fertility in the modern age is because of kind of this regimentation of industrial life and industrial labor that goes against our natural impulses.

54:53But you have countries that... Whose economies do not rely on this kind of industrial regimentation, perhaps, who are also seeing falling fertility now, and nor did you have this falling fertility in the 19th century. I would propose that perhaps it is industrial-scale consumption rather than production that leads to falling fertility in the sense that although many developing countries do not have dynamic industrial economies of their own, they do have access to the results and the goods of industrial production because it is so incredibly powerful.

55:22You know, there are many examples I could give. If you go to the third world, generally, everybody will have a cheap smartphone at this point. They will be able to access infinite content from the internet. We have kind of eliminated famines as a source of death around the world. The famines that we do have are pretty much all political in nature. They're not for the result of our ability to grow enough food.

55:43Many, many developing countries actually import large amounts of food from the developed world rather than the other way around because we subsidize and give it out for free. We have organizations like the World Bank, the IMF, that pretty much go to developing countries and donate. And built for them electrical infrastructure, water infrastructure. We are so productive that we are kind of capable of just going out and giving all of this industrial-scale consumption away practically for free.

56:10And so perhaps it is not that we are being worked to death in a way that is why our fertility rate is falling, but because we are being given no choice but to die comfortably if we are not able to advance industry further. So the point of the earlier kind of super yachts example was that if you consider the consumerist appetites of humanity as the kind of ultimate goal or driver of industrial development, well, again, if you gave a super yacht to every single person on the planet, even for free, this sum total of consumerist appetite would barely scratch the Earth's surface.

56:47It would not even be enough to use up an entire asteroid. So if we think of consumerist appetites as the source of economic growth in this way, we are actually foreclosing on the idea of expansion into space. And we are apparently also foreclosing not just on growth of humanity demographically, but even maintenance at stasis. Because raising kids is hard work, and if we don't want to work, and if we don't need people, people won't even do that.

57:15So human population growth is not really incremental or linear. It's much more exponential in the sense that, you know, if everybody in one generation has twice as many or half as many children, you're going to have a much greater decline in the size of the generations than is obvious for the total population kind of statistics. And the problem that we have now as a civilization is that the decline in fertility implying this decline in population is also implying that we are going to have a technological regression or collapse at some point. Because if you lose large amounts of productive laborers and productive people, we're not going to be able to maintain the same scale of technological and industrial systems as we have in the past.

58:02This is Seoul in South Korea. South Korea is one of the most industrially productive societies in history. But it also has a fertility rate of just 0.75, which is one of the lowest in the world. And at this rate, the three generations, the newest generation of South Koreans, will be 96% smaller than the current generation. And basically, it is highly unlikely that a South Korea of 5 million people will be as productive as the South Korea of 50 million people that we in fact have today.

58:32So, on some level, we think that when we are limiting industry, limiting technological growth in various ways, that we are preserving humanity in this kind of humanitarian way by preventing us from destroying ourselves or the environment. But ironically, we are perhaps eliminating humanity by limiting industry. We kind of have this need to believe that AI will be able to replace humanity because otherwise it appears that we are just destroying our own human capital base and ultimately the economic and technological base of industrial civilization. So we have ironically falsely labeled the artificial limitation of industry and the resulting problems.

59:13It's very popular to think of these problems as problems of sort of technological, modern capitalistic society. But we have also falsely labeled humanity as a set of things that we do under these circumstances of limitation, rather than what we do when we have unlimited industrial and technological developments where both man and machine can kind of grow in tandem. And so, you know, if we think that we can limit and automate all necessary economic and industrial processes, we have actually turned humanity itself into a liability.

59:46And in this confusion, you have a kind of AI [unclear], if you will, or kind of, you know, there's not a great word for this, but we'll go with that. They think, well, technological industry is clearly a good thing, and if there is an opposition between industry and humanity, humanity will have to go. And then on the other... The other end of the spectrum, you kind of have degrowth, environmentalist -minded people who think, well, I think humanity is a good thing, so industry, technology, and humanity are incompatible.

1:00:12It's technology and industry that must go.

Space developmentalism and an interstellar future

Marko Jukic

1:00:15So what I would call spacism or space developmentalism, this view I have presented to you tonight, I think preserves humanity and technology and industry at the same time because it shows industry and technology is not in opposition to humanity, but is actually an extension of us. We are the machines too. The way to preserve humanity is not to limit industry, but to unleash it.

1:00:40And we must simply outgrow our ability to destroy ourselves, which is what we have done throughout history so far. And by limiting the development of industry and technology, we are ironically slowly destroying ourselves right now, slowly in a way that might become much faster, and failing to preserve humanity as a result. There is no stasis in this universe. You kind of have to either grow or die.

1:01:04And if we are going to grow or die, we are actually either going to grow forever, up to the limits of physical possibility, or we are going to die relatively soon in the grand scheme of history. And that which destroys itself does not need to be humored or argued against. So, this is something most people have probably not seen. This is a map of all the stars within 50 light years of our solar system.

1:01:29I think this is a very kind of, you know, a... What's a good word here? A very touching map because this actually shows all the places we could visit if we didn't expand beyond the solar system into interstellar space. The galaxy is kind of too big of a thing to look at. These are many of the first places that we would go.

1:01:51So in concluding, in sort of, to give some concluding remarks, I think that the next iteration of powerful organizations, you know, these sort of industrial-scale organizations that we have in terms of governments or companies, militaries, whatever, whether it is the current iteration that we have that is reformed or a new one entirely, I think the kind of point of intervention for the future of civilization is to increase the level of ambition from simply dominating the planet that we have and perhaps bringing affluence to all the people on it to also achieving this kind of interstellar escape velocity, if you will, where we have a civilization capable of sending generation ships of human beings to other stars. I think this is an ambition that is appropriate to the scale of our current technological capabilities and where they might lead.

1:02:40And I also tend to think the only reason to develop the whole solar system when you think of things like asteroid mining or Mars colonization. Ultimately, the only good reason to do this is to build an infrastructure to go much further and go into interstellar space. You know, you can imagine that there might be kind of a sort of, not political, but a political or sort of benefits of individual freedom of humanity extending across many stars.

1:03:07You know, perhaps the best defense against the deadening sclerosis. of planetary-scale institutions that decay is to see many human civilizations who are too far away from each other to be subject to such organizations, basically to create this escape valve into the wider universe that we don't have right now because our technology is not actually yet advanced enough. Perhaps this is the true guarantee of freedom and autonomy for humanity. You know, we have a speed limit of light in this universe and it prevents how fast you can go.

1:03:36And perhaps if we have enough people spreading throughout the universe, It will truly become impossible for any one tyrant or sclerotic system to dominate all of humanity. We do not know what humanity really is in our final form because we have not gone to space. We don't know what kinds of true talents and limitations, pleasures, and surprises we will encounter. To give perhaps a more tangible picture of what the future economy might look like.

1:04:07There was a time when our economy, if you measured it by GDP, would have been 90% hunting and gathering. And at that time, it probably would have been unimaginable that at a certain point in the future, 90% of GDP would be in agriculture. And at that time, it was probably inconceivable that at some point in the future 90% of the economy will be manufacturing, so perhaps in the future we will have a society or a civilization where 90% of GDP is spent on antimatter fuel production, which is the most energy-dense substance known to man, which we will use to travel between the stars as we have made everything else too cheap to even charge for.

1:04:42We can choose not to care and not to try to go to space, not to care about any of this, But there is so much time left for our descendants, ultimately, to try to do so themselves in the future, that really the universe is kind of just waiting for us to try. And time will always continue to pass. Now, to leave us on a sort of final note, one vision that I find interesting, and perhaps you will too, when you travel at relativistic speeds close to the speed of light, you know you could travel actually extremely far throughout the universe at the cost of never really being able to communicate with the people you left behind, because time will travel much more quickly for them than it will for you.

1:05:25If you're trying to build an empire across many stars where you can kind of, you know, interact with and, you know, trade and maybe dominate different stars, this is perhaps a drawback. But if you don't care about that, perhaps this is a very big advantage. You know, we don't know why we cannot detect advanced alien life in the universe. It's not clear. We don't really know what's going on there.

1:05:46This is called the Fermi paradox. But for all we know, we might be the first and only intelligent life in the universe. We are capable of traveling very far across it at relativistic speeds. Perhaps our destiny is to be this kind of elder race of life, seeding life throughout the galaxy and throughout the universe. And perhaps one day we will have millions and trillions and quadrillions of very different descendants across this galaxy and many more who will be able to live very different and free and interesting lives of their own in the future. and they will meet many millions of years from now, and they won't know that they will have us to thank.

1:06:24so thank you everyone. that is the end of the talk.

Audience Q&A

Marko Jukic, moderators, and audience

1:06:46And we'll now take time for two questions. Please raise your hands. If you wanna ask Marko a question. So we have three... [unclear] The gentleman in the back. Here we go. Hi there. One of the questions I have is about bringing up that, you know, we're not making our industry important as hard we could, you know, because of, like, you know, governments and other things, and one thing is that we're doing a little less with that. But one of the things that I look at is productivity and efficiency that comes out of it.

1:07:38And if you look at our history, it's about efficiencies that drive growth. Industrial Revolution, that drives growth. You look at computers, they take out the whole room, they're in our pocket. So the efficiencies in the world, you know, and materials. We don't know what materials are going to be made in the future. So can you talk to the efficiencies of productivity and why that's a lever that you didn't talk about too much?

1:08:11Well, okay, maybe I didn't make myself too clear or we just got lost in the abstraction a little bit, but I think the increase in efficiency is definitely what drives the technological progress and the economic growth. The economic growth certainly to a great degree. You know, this is sort of what I mean when I say that every iteration of an automated process makes it more efficient and reduces the margin for human labor in the same way that a phone can do a lot, you know, a computer in a phone, and a smartphone can do a lot more today with a lot less human intervention than an IBM computer from the 1960s that takes up a whole room. But I would say that, you know, you do have this process of kind of I might call it logistical optimization, but you also have many instances of kind of, you know, much more creative moments of genius in the history of science and technology when you didn't just kind of incrementally go, you know, you didn't kind of incrementally improve a technology or a process in this sort of predictable incremental way. Often...

1:09:14You also get these, you know, very big leaps of understanding and wisdom, which drives forward much more quickly. And so I think those two things are related, but I think both have their role to play in the advancements of the economy and of human civilization. And I think if you limit specifically the further development of technology the way that we have, you kind of rule out the whole class of logistical optimizations and a whole class of leaps of insight and you kind of reduce yourself to a much smaller category that are compatible with these like uh new limitations that you have set, if that kind of makes sense.

1:10:08one more question and uh try to make it keep it short. Yes, exactly. the question not a comment. uh Gentleman, all the way in the back. a quick question Marko, you live in Europe, correct? Yes. How does that affect your vision on this? As Americans [unclear] So, very good question, actually. I think, you know, I could talk about this all night, and I probably will.

1:10:35When you live in Europe, you live in a society that, in many ways, was the past of America, and in many ways is the future of America. And what I mean by that is you are simultaneously surrounded by the kind of ruins of this extremely productive industrial civilization that existed in the 19th and in the early 20th centuries. I mean, it was very productive throughout the 20th century, but of course the sharpest accelerations were at the end of the 19th and at the beginning of the 20th centuries.

1:11:08And it's no longer anywhere close to being as dynamic today, and it is in many ways much more restricted even than the United States is. And so you kind of have this extreme contrast where you have entire societies that are in many ways living off of the inherited wealth of the past. And, of course, for Americans, it's very common to argue that America is doing much better than Europe. America is, like, much more economically free than Europe. It's, like, more politically free and, like, this, that, and the third thing. And while there are, while there's a lot of truth to that... When you compare either America or Europe to America or Europe from 1900 or from 1850, you know, you're really looking at two societies today that are extremely similar compared to those societies in the past, and they're both extremely, extremely restrictive.

1:11:56And, you know, it's sort of like any Americans who think that It's not possible for American society to become comfortable with kind of a slow drop in industrial productivity and standards of living and functionality. You can look at Europe and see a society where this has already happened and you can still kind of live off the inherited wealth and the paths to new growth or new dynamism are like even more choked off.

1:12:25And, you know, in America, to a certain degree, this has perhaps already happened in the sense that, you know, there's like, there's a great chart from World War II when the Pentagon was doing its own internal kind of analysis of which regions of the United States were the most industrially productive and crucial to the war effort. And they made this map where each state is as large as its industry.

1:12:48And that map of America pretty much only looks like the Northeast and the Midwest. And the rest of the entire country is just its own periphery. And, you know, if you compare that kind of old America to Europe from the 19th century, well, that old America and that old, you know, that old industrial Industrial America has already itself disappeared in the last, you know, 80,90 years.

1:13:09So, that will be my answer.

Closing remarks

Samo Burja and Michael

1:13:19I would encourage at this point everyone in this room to subscribe to Palladium Magazine. Not only you get to read the words of interesting speakers and thinkers like Marko Jukic, you get a big beautiful physical print magazine and we will in the very near future likely in the middle of January have the first proper Palladium launch party here in New York. Thank you.

1:13:53This is still available. Take what refreshments remain. We'll ask Marko questions, but without [unclear]. Thank you guys all for coming, and we'll have more music, and there's plenty of sushi and cheese and drinks in the back, so make sure to grab some.