The Internet Of Dongs Project RenderMan https://desci.nyc/transcripts/the-internet-of-dongs-project Automatically generated transcript. May contain errors. [0:00] [Music] [Music] like Um, do it all. Just go walk around a little bit. Just like Are you [0:44] [Music] live? Heat. Heat. [Music] Oh [Music] [1:31] no. Heat. [1:41] Heat. Heat. Heat. [Applause] [Music] I was trying to figure [Music] [Applause] [Music] [Applause] [Music] Okay. Heat. [2:33] [Music] Yes. Um I mean I'm really active in the actual community. [Music] [Music] probably downstairs. [Music] You said that was [Music] Um, we need to set this up. [Music] Yeah, just cut it up. [Music] [Music] the Yeah. [4:29] [Music] [Music] Right. [Music] Okay, come come. We're going to start. Everyone find a chair. We're going to get rolling here. Can you see this in the camera? Uh, I I'll adjust. Yeah, that's I'll adjust. All right, everyone. Hey. All right, we're going to start. The speaker is on the line. We have some space up here if people want to come. You don't have to stand in the side, but [5:35] if you do want to, um, you're welcome to. All right. Thank you guys all for coming tonight. Um, we post all our uh we post all of our pictures on um on te on not Telegram on Twitter and on Instagram. And we're actually like, as you can see here, David is doing a really good job taking photos. So, if you want to like see yourself, um, you can follow us on mostly Instagram and then you can see your own pictures, which is has some novelty and if you don't know about a selfie yet. Um, and then what else did I want to say? Oh, thank you to um all the people that volunteered. So, Yana, raise your hand if you wear if you volunteered. [6:17] Kristen, everyone raise it. Thank you. Thank you, Conrad. Anyone else? We have a couple more I think in the back. Um so, thank you guys all to uh who who volunteered. [6:38] Uh why does it not do the next thing? Okay, so we have DIY NYC events and we have lots and lots of people. Um we have a couple more events coming soon. So we have um Sergey Sergey. Guys, if you're in the back, if you guys want to talk, uh guys, hey, in the MIT sweater, if you guys want to talk, you're welcome to. Um, just please go downstairs and then our feelings will not be hurt. I promise. So, if you want to listen to the science of dildos and be academic upstairs if you want to be degenerate and drink downstairs. That was a joke. Okay. Um, and then we also [7:18] have uh Steven uh who's doing some really cool stuff with uh germline genome editing which is going to be super super interesting. So, um the events and days for those dates are going to be coming soon. Um, finally, we we promise we're doing it this time. We're actually going to be doing a hackathon. So, if you are interested, Anthony, if you're interested in uh actually programming and contributing, uh we're going to be doing that and we're going to be having like a couple different like tracks around um sleep, around weather, and around like AI, building like AI science bots. This is going to be really cool. It's going to be held at a local university. Um and [8:01] they have an amazing space and there's a lot more coming about that but it is happening. Um, if you want to help volunteer for these events or the upcoming hackathon or other things that we are planning, um, we always need help with photos with, um, like if you want to control the social media, the Instagram or the Twitter account, if you want to help out day of, if you want to help find speakers or recommend speakers, um, if you know of any people that would be interested in sponsoring, um, here's the the QR code to do that. So, that's really cool. Um, does anyone want to take a picture? If you're interested in QR code and if [8:43] you're interested in helping volunteer, that is the that is the link to take a picture. Three, two, one. All right, they got you got it. And then, um, lastly, I wanted to talk about this project that we're working on um, around prediction markets and science. So, how many people have like looked at an academic paper and thought saw like there maybe there's something wrong with it, right? Okay. The MIT sweatshirt guy. Um, we thought that too. But how many of you looked at like a stock market like recently and thought there's that's perfectly normal? That was another joke. [9:24] Okay. The uh but basically every like in the stock market at least one person is laughing. Thank you laughed at both the jokes and I appreciate that. Um, and we we realized that like financial markets are really really good at incentivizing truth and accuracy. And um we decided to create it would be really nice to do science around that. And so during the election a lot of people looked at um Fox News as like the the as like those were that's where the experts lived and CNN as where the experts live. if you were trying to figure out if Kamla was going to win or if Trump was going to win and like but [10:05] actually what all the people in the no were doing was looking at like poly market to figure out if poly market was like that that was the source of truth because people were betting with their own real money to determine if um who was going to win. And so when people have like skin in the game and they're incentivized to do accurate review uh reviews of data, they do a much better job. And this is actually like the opposite of what happens in traditional science today where people are peer-reviewing things but they're just sort of randomly throwing out scores. [10:37] And the reason that they're doing that is because they have no incentive to actually do the right thing. Okay. So is there a question or no? No. Okay. Um so our vision is to make science more accurate using um money and prediction markets and financial incentives. And this is something that would is like very fairly taboo within like today within traditional academia. But I think given a couple more years, it'll actually become like this the norm and the standard. [11:09] So, we're using like sleep, we're doing prediction markets around like sleep data and real-time health tracking and blood work and DEXA scans and people are able to bet on these different metrics to determine uh how good someone's going to how well someone is going to sleep um how long they're going to live, what their blood work and what their blood work is going to be like. Um if you like to try out the app, we built it here and you can get it's on iOS right now and we're open to feedback, very open. Or if you'd like to um contribute in a building the app, we're also hiring um particular around like uh like social and uh product [11:49] design types of people. We have all the list of roles there. So if you're interested in trying the app out uh left side, if you're interested in earning money, uh right side. Okay. Now without further ado, we are going to um welcome our ho our our speaker for the night and this is Render. So he is an expert in um are we recording? Okay, good. Um he is an expert in internet connected sex toys and has done mother proud. He's making his mother [12:30] proud and he's um an expert in internet connected sex and we got connected uh over the internet and uh I thought that this would be like a really interesting talk for people. So without further ado, I would like to and render man feel free to give a a bio about yourself as well. Um but without further ado, let's welcome Render Man to see the crowd. Oh yes, of course. [12:56] Like to see an audience here. That's pretty cool. Can you spin the laptop around so I can actually see the crowd? Oh, yes, of course. Like I can see an audience here speaking to a wall. Hey, there we go. Everyone wave and say hi. There you go. Thank you. All right. So, uh despite what some of the uh uh tweets and and blue skies or whatever the hell it went out, uh yeah, we're not talking about like North Korea in your bedroom. Like I wish you had run some of that past me before. [13:26] That was a little uh silly. Um but yes, basically I am uh Brad Renderman Haynes and along with my wife Nicole Circus Schwarz. Uh we run the Internet of Dongs project. Uh basically we are hackers. We work in Infosac though I'm currently looking for employment. Uh I'm up in Canada uh in Alberta. If that helps anybody got any leads, please let me know. Penetration tester. Yes, I'm aware of the irony of that with this topic. [13:55] Um, basically I break a lot of things. She helps figure out how to fix them. So, uh, started this in 2016 because I needed to learn web app hacking, mobile apps, API stuff. And, uh, a lot of the like, uh, uh, baby monitors, refrigerators, uh, your, uh, uh, thermostats, those aren't even taken. uh because of a talk I had given even long before that I was aware that these sort of devices were coming out but never looked at it and then I did and I'm like oh crap this is further along than I thought. Uh so I started the internet of dongs internet of dawn.gs the gs tld is south sandwich [14:36] islands strangely enough. Um I have no idea how sandwich islands and gs works but whatever. Uh, it very quickly became a lot more than I thought. Uh, I basically become sort of an industry watchdog. Uh, the boogeyman that that keeps these guys in line. I don't do as much for the the hacking myself nowadays, but I do a lot to uh keep them on their toes, shall we say. Uh, got a large cash injection from Pornhub to buy test devices. And uh, see if I can show you here. Don't bring it. [15:14] Yeah, you know, that's hand cut foam, but there's two layers, uh, 30 or so different devices for testing. So, I I I'm able I have other researchers occasionally come to me wanting verification. So, I've got the the equipment to do it. Um, day jobs have always been a little interesting with it. Most of them have said, "Please, for the love of God, do not mention who you work for." Uh I don't have that problem right now because unemployed. Uh but we've helped a lot of people and made this industry a hell of a lot better and I'm very grateful that we've been able to do that. So remember kids, the only difference between screwing around in science is writing it down. So in this [15:57] particular case, I do try to keep it professional. I try to keep it uh uh not not juvenile, you know, keep this academic. Uh there is some stuff that is just genuinely funny. I mean, Pornhub at one point was selling a 12PB rubber twerking butt. Seeing that sitting on the table, that's just funny. But these devices are legal, used by consenting adults. Uh it is an industry that uh is is growing dramatically, especially since the pandemic. So, I I do treat this responsibly, but you know, uh I just don't do don't do anything that makes fun of of the users of these. Some things are objectively fun, but let's not go there. [16:38] So like any product today it seems uh sex toys now connect to the internet for various features. Now they're now smart devices like appliances, toys, you know different kinds of toys uh and other sorts of gadgets. And of course the S in IoT stands for security meaning there is very little. uh in 2022, $32 billion market size for IoT stuff, not just not sex toys alone, but uh 302 billion uh for IoT, three trillion by 2030. They're I have no idea where they're getting that number from. [17:18] There's been this mad rush to add connectivity to everything. Uh my god, I mean, there was the the classic example of the juice press. Um, you know, why why does my thermostat have to have internet connection in order to turn the heat on? Like this is some of these things are just plain stupid. Uh, I'm waiting for like the first internet connected waffle iron or something. I mean, we just got a new fridge and oven and they have internet connections on them. Like my fridge has two cameras in it. Future is here and it's stupid. [17:55] Security is very often overlooked and ignored in a lot of these in this mad rush. There's a bunch of problems with uh default passwords, static keys and passwords, no upgrade methods. Uh my fridge and and oven that I I mentioned uh right out of the box use TLS1 uh on their connections, meaning they're already using a depre deprecated uh uh uh security standard and there's no way to update these things. [18:24] Um, many of them also do excessive amounts of data collection just because they turned on a bunch of things and don't think about what they're they're doing. Um, again, why does my oven need an app? Why does my fridge? Um, as with most technologies though, sex effectually becomes involved at some level. The the song the internet is for porn kind of is true when you think about it. Uh, quick bit of history. Uh, Teldonics is actually the the name for this this field. Uh it is the name for uh technology enabling remote controlled sexual activity. This is not necessarily masturbation. Uh someone or something else is controlling sensations. It's not a manually operated device, shall we [19:06] say. Uh this was coined by Ted Nelson in 1975 who among other things coined the term hypertext. I mean, you know, I guess he was good at coining words. Um, it's one of those ideas that when you really start digging into it was always sitting in the background driving things. You know, you look at things like credit cards, uh, uh, CDN's uh, or credit card processing, CDN's, webcam, storage. So much of this stuff can be driven by, you know, porn, sex, masturation. You know, it's we're humans. We're very predictable in that respect. [19:46] So the vast majority, yeah, the vast majority of these devices are Bluetooth Bluetooth low energy. There are a couple of Wi-Fi and like Ziggb devices, but and even a couple of wired ones, but those those are the outliers. For the most part, these are Bluetooth device. They pair to a smartphone for local control and use the phone as a gateway for remote control functionality. Um, essentially it's it's uh like things like Google Meet but with a couple extra buttons that can control things. Uh, there's very often text, audio, video chat functionality built in. Um, usually there's some interaction with vendor servers at some level for the remote control functions or at the very least [20:26] connection brokering. They might use uh uh, you know, much like Skype used to where it would broker the connection between the two users and then be hands off. often just be direct between the users, but at some point it does have to communicate with the server. Um, often there's some basic data analytics sent for vendor diagnostics, you know, usage, uh, you know, the kind of crap that we always click on and say, "Yes, we're okay with this." Uh, you know, and never actually read the whole bloody thing. Very simply, you know, Bluetooth is phone, vendor cloud, you know, how would you get to the vendor cloud, 5G, Wi-Fi, whatever? oftentimes using XMPPP [21:07] um uses that for creating the the video and chat connections and Bluetooth down to the other device. Certain devices like these Chukuru ones uh are able uh uh there are pressure sensors in the the fall one on I guess your right uh that can control uh send commands to the stroker on the left and there's a control on the outside of the stroker that can also control the vibration on the other one. So it's toy to toy. It's not you push it on a screen. It's it's the actual devices. Now, not everybody has, you know, paired toys like these. [21:44] Some people just have a a phone and they're just using the app and they're just, you know, moving a slider or selecting for pre uh uh generated uh uh patterns. U but again, same idea phone to the vendor cloud to, you know, the other phone to the device. Now, benefits of IoT. Uh there's a lot of interesting anonymous benefits, you know, professionals uh uh being able to do webcams and stuff like that without having to uh uh disclose their personal information. Um there is a I did a conference in Detroit last October [22:26] uh no October year ago, a year before uh in Detroit called Securing Sexuality. And in talking to a lot of it was a very interesting one because there was a bunch of technologists, sex therapists, and I'm like the dead center of the ven diagram of this. Um, but for people who are perhaps exploring a kink or experimenting homosexuality, it's a way for them to have some of the experience without, you know, disclosing a lot of personal information or putting themselves in potentially harm's way. [23:02] uh it really helps couples stay uh intimate at a distance. The pandemic was a a gold mine for this. You know, couples that were separated by countries or distance that couldn't be in the same place because of lockdowns. These were a a way for people to stay intimate. I've actually had friends that when I've told them about this kind of usually will be like, "So, what do you think about this particular model?" And I'm like, "Ah, so that's what you have." Uh in one case the uh uh the husband was on the road about three weeks a month uh for work and so trying to be intimate with his partner was not easily done. So these [23:43] devices you know in a hotel you know was able to to have intimate time with his partner. Um relationships professionals cam models that has exploded since the uh uh pandemic. Uh, I look at it as actually a very good industry when you think about it because it's obviously something that people want. Um, if it's done right, it could be anonymous. You control what you do, the hours. Um, you know, like Pikman in most of the rooms, so it's not you don't have to put up with any [ __ ] Uh, and you can make really good money on that. Uh, but it is work. In order to make a lot of money, you do have to basically be performing [24:24] every day or at least giving fans a reason to keep coming back to you because the other reason the other thing is that since it has exploded, there are a ridiculous number of choices out there. So to build your fan base takes a lot of work. Uh some devices do collect data locally uh in the app and use quote AI to increase pleasure. Lioness is a device that does this. It's more machine learning than anything else. basically figures out what uh uh what you like and uh is able to uh uh alter its patterns uh based on that. [24:58] Uh some of these devices are also usable as Keele exercisers and have a medical reporting functionality. The LV trainer is a really interesting one because it was actually made by a technology company that decided to get into the wearables and they actually have a separate API just for medical reporting that uh um so the device you you the the female uh patient would use this for like incontinence or something would use it to uh uh record their uh exercises and the physician could then get a report that was you know all there was just a a patient number basically and uh see the reports of how they've been keeping up on it, how you know forces [25:40] everyone. Really interesting use. Um yeah, you could also use it for a whole bunch of fun stuff too, but dual use. So when I talk data and PII, you know, personally identifiable information, name, birthday, email, phone, address, social security, social insurance number, anything that is not something you generally want to post publicly nowadays. There's also uh personal health or protected health information which is things like medical diagnosises uh medical information like you know who your physician is um metadata data about data you know date stamps of login who connects to whom uh the genders of partners length of sessions uh even what [26:22] IP they're coming from because data involved in internet of dong's uh devices are sexual in nature The society is very weird when it comes to anything resembling sex. Uh it's considered very salacious and carries a lot more weight in a a strange way uh in terms of expectations of privacy and also in the amount of damage done if disclosed. If a device is recording, you know, if your fridge sends to the manufacturer how many times a day you're opening up your fridge, you probably don't care about that other than like maybe a little bit of shame as to how much you're stacking, how many times a [27:04] day you're using your vibrator, that's a whole different thing. People treat it very differently. But when you realize that it's it's actually the same type of information. It's about, you know, how often you do a particular activity. well, doesn't you know, you can put yourself in that position. You wouldn't want a manufacturer necessarily knowing that. Uh, one could also extend this out to situations of infidelity if say the app on a person's phone is connected with their uh the app on their secretary instead of their wife, that sort of thing. Uh, you know, the sort of things they're doing when they say they're on a business trip, whatever. Uh, disclosure proclivities. um some of these sites, [27:45] you know, if if uh maybe somebody's exploring homosexuality and hasn't, you know, admitted to their partner. uh in certain countries homosexuality is illegal and because if it if the app is done insecurely if a a country was uh say filtering you know looking for anybody that was was using these devices they may be able to tell oh I have two strokers meaning you know two males uh uh connecting with these devices oh they must be homosexuals let's go raid them the sort of thing that gets people killed but there's the standard stuff, product analytics, um, you know, what's a favorite pattern, [28:26] what's, you know, time of day use, etc. The sort of stuff that's in so many apps nowadays that we don't think about, but this sort of logging can create unintentional dossas. Probably are aware in 2016, We Vibe, now WOW group, uh, was sued for collecting user data without disclosure. Among the things were the email address which was used as a login information login username. Uh favorite pattern and settings you know do you like it as a three or do you go all the way up to 11. [29:02] Uh there's also diagnostic information for like chipset temperature which a lot of people construe with body temperature but it's not uh day and time of usage uh again be via login just with this sort of of information that we freely give out uh we're able to build a bit of a dossier on these users if you were to pull all this information together. There was no evidence they were actually doing that, but all the disperate pieces were there. The problem was, and the reason they got sued was somebody had copied the uh disclosure notification for the website and put that into the app, not [29:44] the proper legal information that was supposed to be in the app. This, of course, meant they weren't disclosing that they were collecting this information. Uh so, yeah, they got the crap suit out of them. uh $3.2 million US and I have it on good authority that they didn't expect it to be that much and so it caught them really offguard with that one. Um so we vibe though at the time and even now is still kind of a high water mark for security. They were doing so many things right but they were became the the the example of what not to do even despite that. Um, since then they have [30:25] gone way better. One-time links, you don't actually have to log in. You just generate a onetime link that you communicate to your partner over, you know, signal, text, whatever platform you want. Uh, they minimize data collection and very clearly explain what is collected and also things like permissions, you know, what it's collecting, how it's using it. You know, they're very forward with this, which is good. You know, makes you feel better when you actually know rather than having to guess. Um, again, you have to think about it if your teapot was collecting similar data. I mean, not necessarily you're doing certain things with your teapot, but you know, the temperature of the chipset, the the times you're using it, the username is [31:05] your email address. Um, if your teapot was collecting similar data, would you even care? But if your sex toy is, it'll do. Now, with the there are many risks in Internet of Things. You We can't go a week without hearing about something. Uh but some are very specific to uh internet of dongs type of devices. But never attribute to malice what you can attribute to stupidity. When I first started this, it was, shall we say, a a bunch of lowhanging fruit. It was so easy. Uh out of the eight vendors uh the big players at the time that I went after almost [31:47] 2011 I found horrific vulnerabilities. Uh more than one I was able to get uh uh like entire user databases. One of them literally you send a query uh through their API with a pair of double quotes and it sits there churning and churning taking a while and you're like oh it'll probably time out. No, it was building a 36meg JSON file of the entire user database and just barfed it right back to you. And you could do this without any authentication. That's bad. But in talking to these companies, so many of them didn't know what they didn't know. So you can't attribute to malice if you attribute to stupidity. [32:26] They didn't realize they're a software company now. They had previously made, you know, a physical device. They had good say electrical engineers, material engineers, you know, product designers, you know, but then somebody got a a uh chipset from, you know, kit from Nordic or TI or whatever, put it in, built a quick app. Hey, now you're 100 milliseconds away from every jerk on the planet. You have to act like it. So many of them don't go to the conferences that I do or that some of you might. And it's a uh uh uh they they genuinely didn't know. I came to them and so many of them [33:07] use the the thoughts and prayers example or phrasing of well we care about the security and privacy of your our customers. I'm like, "Yeah, great. You actually know how to do that." And almost to one, there was that light bulb moment where they're like, "Oh crap, I need to read a bunch and get our crap together." And more than one had to rebuild their entire uh uh API, their entire back end from the ground up um because they built it so poorly. Uh sometimes there's actual ballots from outside attackers, password spray attacks. You know, there could be stalkers that have some information that are able to leverage that, like just knowing a person's email. Maybe they could guess a password. Uh there's exes [33:49] that may have all sorts of information uh that could get into into this and see who perhaps uh uh you know, their the app is partnered with. Uh again, nation states looking for, you know, lascivious or or illegal activity, you know, whatever because sex is involved is considered scandalous and far more damaging if disclosed accidentally or intentionally. There's even a physical danger. There's a product uh QUI, Chinese company, made the cellmate lockin, basically a male chastity cage. [34:24] Uh, in order to unlock this, you needed to use the app. And in order to do that, it had to contact the manufacturer server to get a key to then send to the device to over Bluetooth to unlock it. So, if you were in an area where you didn't have connectivity or say you got locked out of your account, you couldn't unlock this thing. and if something was swelling that shouldn't be or there's other problems. [34:54] There was no way to get out of this thing without bolt cutters in a very sensitive location. Um, and their API was so horrible it would barf out plain text passwords. Um, so within minutes of us disclosing that there was even an issue after six months of bugging to fix this thing, the we literally had the first uh ransomware associated with a sex toy. Uh, so I basically had a Pearl script or a sorry Python script that went through, grabbed all the passwords for all the accounts, changed the passwords, sent an email to the registered user's email demanding Bitcoin in order to get back [35:36] into the account and potentially unlock the device. So they need a Bitcoin to unlock your junk. Again, we live in the future and it's stupid. There's other potential like depending on how it's designed. if you're able to send direct commands where through software they're limiting it to say a five on the you know scale uh uh that the motor is potentially capable of you set a direct command to the chipset that says no go to all the way to 11 Samsung showed a number of years ago uh lithium ion batteries catching fire because they've overheated is a bad thing and you can imagine what the result would be in a very sensitive location. [36:16] Now, there's a lot of theoretical versus probable risks, local and remote. There's risks that are specific to professional users versus the average consumer. There's different risks for different groups and usage scenarios. Now, when I say a local compromise, that's hijacking or taking control over the Bluetooth connection. You know, something that I don't generally worry about because if somebody is connecting to your sex toy over Bluetooth, at best on a bench, they're 30 feet away, give or take, meaning they're outside your window. You've got a much bigger problem. Call the police. [36:53] Uh, the only time I've ever heard of it actually being an issue was somebody in a duplex where there was a shared wall between the bedrooms and they could tell uh when the uh neighbor was using the device by seeing it on Bluetooth. And I'm like, at that point, even if you took it over, they probably couldn't tell the difference. So, really, is that a problem? Not not the biggest threat. [37:18] Um, remote account compromise is the one that that scares me. Uh, password guessing, password reuse, you know, there's all sorts of lists and and uh uh disclosures and breaches that happen, password stuffing, attacks on these things. Uh, exes may know a password. Uh, and if somebody guesses it right, could give a person access to account contents, which could include photos, histories, um, could also allow for impersonation of the user's partner. And this is the one that scares me because not there's a few jurisdictions that actually have [37:58] laws related to uh, rape by imp u by rape by deception is what a lot of them are called. That's the one where if like my twin brother uh slept with my wife pretending to be me kind of situation. Uh but if you are pretending to be somebody you are not. So if I I log into somebody's account I pretend to be their their husband or whatever and I'm one controlling it. By a lot of definitions that is a remote sexual assault and there are only a few jurisdictions that actually even consider that being possible. like uses a new meaning the term reach out and touch someone, right? The other one is vendor breaches. [38:40] What happens if the vendor's backend systems get compromised via misconfiguration, exploitation and password compromise, mass dump of data? Um, you'll remember the Ashley Madison dump that happened a number of years ago that ended up with people having their entire lives destroyed because they were on there. uh whether or not it was consensual with their partner or whatever. Um that's their private business. It people committed suicide because of it because it destroyed their lives, you know, because the the public again judges sexual data very uh uh [39:21] differently than a lot of others. So the thing you have to think about with these attacks is effort, risk, reward. a real-time attack, meaning impersonation, account takeover. That's actually kind of low when you think about it because you know the other person has to be online ready to go and you have to be logged in. I mean you and in the case of things like Wee Vibe, you would have to know where that one time uh uh room URL was sent in order to intercept it and log in. Not all of them do that. Some of them might set through the app, but your your window of opportunity is very very small. [40:02] Maybe some sort of blackmail or something. The fact that they're even on the app or you compensating something salacious, but you know, it's not something that I see as a a very huge deal. Now, a vendor breach where you're compromising a mass number of accounts uh or mass exploitation of the backend system, you know, using that for blackmail or extortion of the users or the company because yeah, if you're able to dump a database of all the email addresses that are in there, there could be some interesting ones because my god, people use their work emails on these sites. I have dumped more than one uh user database [40:42] out of these things and it is terrifying that people have no operational security at all. You know, again, local attack in a private setting means there's a stalker outside the window. You got other problems. A local attack is in public. The range is extremely limited on these things because again, they're Bluetooth. And so that makes the window of opportunity very small. And if you're wearing in public, you're probably expecting, you know, a a partner nearby to be controlling it or something like that. You may not notice that controlling it. You know, you're you're the end result is essentially the same. [41:18] And I like to say that my wife literally put her ass on the line to test this. The effective range of these is between four and six feet when actually being worn because most of these are 2.4 GHz and that is generally absorbed by water. And what are humans made mostly of? So when you surround say a uh Bluetooth enabled butt plug which is surrounded by a bunch of meat uh yeah your range is severely attenuated and we did this at a at Defcon a number of years ago for a wireless contest. We sent out a the uh Bluetooth address of the device and my wife was wearing this thing. girlfriend at the time was wearing this thing and [41:58] walking around the immediate area of the contest and user said we sent them that and uh the uh uh buttplug.io documentation on how to uh control it manually. Hi Q dot. Um I know Q dot runs buttplug.io is in there. Oh, there. Yeah, waving. Hey. Um you know, sent them instructions on what to do. So they had to uh take control of it and set it off. uh and also identify who it was and then prove it by setting it off. Um it was funny because people were setting it off regularly, but you know there was just one young guy just that [42:40] was doing like this this circling shark pattern trying to find her and was mortified that when he he set it off to prove that you know it was him. He was like oh god I feel so bad. She's like I signed up for this. This is all with permission. It's all good. Um, but yeah, needless to say, we we put our asses on the line. Um, but if you're using these in public setting and it's behaving oddly like somebody else is is uh controlling it or it's doing Morse code or something like that, look for the person with their, you know, phone in the or or in front of them or a laptop in their immediate area and punch them. [43:21] especially if they're laughing maniacally because they're the ones probably doing it and they're that close. So if you're within punch range, yeah, probably not a good thing. The other thing is a lot of times people using these in a public setting are typically using it at events where consent is a very very big deal and if you're doing unconceptual things, these people are usually well equipped to beat the living crap out of each other and wouldn't take too kindly to this sort of behavior. So yeah, might be putting your own life at risk. Again, you know, local compromise versus vendor breach. You know, likelihood, you know, again, vendor breach, you've got the chance to extort the company and get some uh uh money on the deal. The local [44:02] compromise, most of most people doing bad things, there is a money angle. I don't see a money angle with a local compromise. vendor breach. I do. If you're a manufacturer, you know, of these devices, realize you're a software company now. Act like it. I see so many devices show up on like the crowdfunding sites. Uh I mean, go uh Kickstarter doesn't do them anymore, but others do that have this great idea, but haven't thought of any of this crap. you know, IoT information security or IoT security foundation has consumer IoT guidelines for what you need to do. [44:41] There's a bunch of top 10 lists out there that basically say things like don't use default passwords, avoid data collection, you know, all this stuff that should be, you know, no duh kind of things. But again, these are people that typically are in an industry that up until, you know, say, you know, 15, 20 years ago, everything was manually operated. They don't know what they don't know. And I kind of exist to scare living crap out of them. I mean, there's been more than one that have uh withdrawn their their fund their uh request for funding because they realized, oh crap, we didn't think of this because so many people were like, have you asked, you [45:22] know, internet of dongs about this? And so, yeah, I like being that boogeyman. Um, UK has or US has the Internet of Things cyber security improvement act 2020. When that will be uh when that will be killed off, who knows? uh UK code of practice for consumer IoT from 2018. Australia has one too. But simply think less is more. If you don't collect it, you don't have to protect it. This was the basis for PCI uh uh compliance with credit cards. [45:52] The idea was if you don't collect it, you don't have and don't store it, you don't have to protect it. That's the easy way. So, but unfortunately, they they screw that up. Um persistent user accounts versus one-time links that you share with a partner. Yeah, persistent user account may be a little easier, but the security level of a one-time link with a partner is so much better because then you don't have to give email addresses. You don't have to log in. [46:18] You're not storing it. You don't have that persistence. It's one-time use, you know, generation time. It cost them a lot of money. They learned and improved. So, stop trying to reinvent the wheel. So many of the problems we've seen in these devices are like basic authentication and authorizations, you know, OAS top 10 crap that just 20 freaking years ago, 25 even. But they don't know what they don't know. So, it's been sad really in a lot of ways. But, you know, you got to beat them over the head sometimes with this stuff. [46:56] If you're a buyer of these things, look at the manufacturers's websites and their privacy policies. You can usually tell from those, have they actually thought this through or is it all um just a a copy paste, you know, uh boilerplate one? Um if can you determine who they are like who made these things? If you can't, meaning you can't find their privacy policies, run. All right. Um, check their FAQs. Can you delete an account if it requires you to uh create one and you request your account be [47:37] deleted? Pardon me. Do they have a security page? One of the things I've been working with a lot of vendors on is setting up a vulnerability disclosure program. a way that if you find a bug, you have a way to submit it uh to the company, to the developers so that they know what is uh going on and they're in a position to be able to uh uh fix it. [48:04] You know, this isn't necessarily a bug bounty where you get paid. Some do. Loveance does. And but if they have a link that says, "Hey, we take security responsibly." If you find a bug, here's how to contact us. That's a good sign, meaning they actually pay attention to this. You know, can you just wipe out the account and start over? You know, is the account locked to the device? Did you have to scan a QR code or input a serial number or something like that? [48:34] Meaning if your account is compromised or there's a situation with a stock or an X and you just wipe it out, start, you know, create a new one, you know, disassociated email address. Yeah. Can you find out who the manufacturer is? There's a whole thing in China of what we generally call white box manufacturers, meaning they have a design and if you're a chain of stores or something like that and you want to have your own branded one, um they'll slap their your label on the outside of the box and and push this thing out the door and you know reskin the app. But after they it's gone out the door, they have no vested interest anymore in this. They have no economic [49:15] interest, meaning they don't care about things like updates. They're absolute crap. You see the same device by six under six different names. And if it's cheap, remember, you get what you pay for. A lot of devices are 100 bucks plus, you know, some two or 300. There's a reason, you know, if it's like 25 bucks, it's super scary. uh if you're not comfortable with the risks, manual devices still exist and still work really, really well. If you do buy one of these devices, when you're setting it up, you need to think about things like operational security. Operational security is preventing sensitive [49:56] information from getting into the wrong hands. Email addresses are free. You could create a new Gmail account for free. There are tons of different ways. You can even do it for like one time use, you know, mailinator sort of stuff. Use it only for that app or site. You don't have to use your real name or information. Make name generator. We'll come up with one for you. You don't have to use like just create an email address completely dissociated from your your personal. So if it is compromised, that's the only place it shows up. The only thing if they they somehow brute forced it would be the registration email for this sex toy. Nothing else leads back to you there. [50:37] um use a password manager to generate and remember strong passwords if you do have to uh remember a password for it. If you're sending images or video through these, particularly any that allow for anonymous, you know, like old school omegal kind of of situations, be aware of what's in the background in your surroundings. Uh it is astonishing what you know on on Twitter X whatever you want to call it now are people that will post like a picture of them you know the the table at a restaurant and say where am I or some random building where am I and there's just tiny little details they'll pull out of it that will random people in the area are able [51:19] to figure out exactly what street corner they're on or what what restaurant you know in what city they're in. It is terrifying. Um, so you also have to consider what happens if a relationship ends, you know. Uh, is this stuff you are are say uh comfortable with being screenshotted or saved? Do you trust the other person to do the right thing and not share this or delete it or whatever you request? [51:45] Um, if not, maybe don't send pictures. Like, you know, imagination is a great thing when you're setting it up. Bluetooth and location services confuse the living crap out of a lot of people. Android 6 and up uh up until 11 asks when it needs loc uh Bluetooth it automatically asks for location services GPS access permission as well. That scared so many people because it's like oh my god is this thing going to record my my GPS location? Um, no. Because it Bluetooth could be used for indoor geoloccation, you know, [52:26] basically a replacement for GPS. Uh, that to use that you had when you turn on Bluetooth, it had to use location services to do lookup for Bluetooth like base station type situations. Later versions of Android 11 and up now have a Bluetooth administrative permission that doesn't need the location permissions. So it scares people a lot less, but it's amazing the number of people that still use ancient Android devices for these sort of things. Many apps have not updated to use this because they can still ask on new versions of Android or that old uh location permission model. So [53:06] uh it is very rare that anyone actually need your GPS location. Usually it's for a very obvious thing, a media note nearby. that sort of thing. Um, some of them do. Like I said, there's there's an anonymous one of like was in my immediate area that may want to play. Uh, there's a company by Ratisimo that had a feature like that. Unfortunately, um, was leaking GPS location of all their users to any other users. There was another vendor that uh had a search feature, sort of a Tinder-l like thing where you could invite random people to control the toy and it had a distance measurement like how far away was this person from you. There's [53:49] multiple ways to do that calculation. They did it this the the lazy way and just exchange GPS locations of users and calculated it locally, meaning every result on the search gave you GPS locations. That was scary because I was able to dump all of them and really interesting plot out on a map actually. But the information that was disclosing was was terrifying. Um, are you aware of all the features? Do you know how to disable the ones you don't want? you know, can you deny permissions and still use, you know, uh, other features of the things? Read the manual. If you're a buyer and you have a post breakup, if it has an account, [54:30] delete the account if possible. If not, change the email to a new single- use email or at least change the password. Many people don't do this. Use a new password on the new account. Don't reuse reuse the password. This should be for any sort of sexy account or banking or anything. Vent life, Only Fans, other dating apps, whatever. Um, it's unfortunately not something a lot of people know or do. [54:58] It's a high-risisk breakup. There are sites like Safe Escape, Lockdown Your Life that will even help you with like figuring out your device integrity. Has your device been compromised? I mean, your phone, not necessarily your sex toy. Um, you know, be aware of the the backup lost password confirmation emails to other accounts. I've run into more than one case where somebody has say Gmail account, it gets compromised, but they've also been able to compromise their uh Apple email. And so when it you the to try to get the email address for the Gmail or no they compromise the uh Apple one try to change the password on the Gmail one [55:39] it sends the confirmation to the already compromised account and now they got the Gmail one too. So you don't necessarily want to link all these things to each other. Um, you know, local attacks are an unlikely occurrence, but it's a radio. It goes through walls, consider it. Things like Violet Blue, Smart Girls Guide to Privacy, you know, not necessarily relevant to this particular topic, put some really good advice in there. If you're a professional, meaning cam model or other such thing, minimal use of real name and info, usually just for legal verification with whoever you're sign up for, whatever camp sites should never use it, not even type it into the [56:21] machine you're using for this setup. If you're doing, you know, Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, whatever for, you know, building your fan base, do it as under separate accounts on separate devices. My wife actually signed up for a bunch of the cam sites uh to test what sort of information was sent. Uh she also signed up for a Twitter account under that handle connected to no one. No information directly related to her. Within one week a friend said oh and she had posted a picture of herself on it. Within one week a friend said hey I found this thing and is I I feel really bad like is [57:01] this official? She's like, "Tell me exactly how this happened." And it was through a recommendation because it she had put it on her phone where she was logged into other accounts, too. They figured, "Oh, you use both of these accounts on the same device. Therefore, you probably know a lot the the same people and so I'll recommend you." So, you can imagine if you also had your family on there as well that suddenly your professional, your personal can intermix in bad ways. Um, read all the device features and integrations, how they work. Many of the cam sites have integrations for these various toys. Use only the official apps and integrations. [57:41] Some have like a marketplace where users can provide scripts. Yeah, unless you can read the code and fully understand it, don't trust them. Just stick with what the manufacturers give you. Um, again, avoid devices you can't easily identify. If you are wanting to do interesting things on sites with game streaming um and get some interesting haptic feedback, shall we say, uh talk Q dot raise your hand again. Talk to that guy uh runs buttplug.io.io. So if you really want to, you know, feel when your your your ass gets shot off uh in a game, he'd be able to help there. Um, again, if you're a professional, [58:22] use a clean slate of a room. Like the fact that you're able to see things in my, you know, behind me. Let's let's do a let's do a few more minutes and then go to questions. Just about done here. Okay. Right. Um, IKEA furniture generic as you can get and use a VPN. Like just make it pop out wherever you can. And so, thank you and go [ __ ] yourself safely. [58:48] So now we've got questions. Okay. Awesome. Does anyone have any questions? Anyone from the audience? Buer. Yes. Go ahead. Come up to the stage. Yeah. Or shut it. Can Can you hear? Can you hear? Uh, no, I can't. You'll have to repeat it probably. Okay. Yeah. I just wanted to ask I was getting to the computer. Okay. Um what the like highest risk things are now for companies that kind of are doing everything right over you know in terms [59:29] of security best practices over the last 10 years. Um you know what uh risks do you see going forward in the next like five to 10 years? I can tell you about one right now. um I can disclose the company or any uh specific details but the uh other researchers found these and reached out to me to help them verify and to reach out to the company and they uh uh they had basically found a way that you could generate the user's token uh and so from that if you knew the username you generate the token and then retrieve the user's email address which [1:00:10] is again PII something that was not publicly disclosed. Once you have the sorry one vulnerability allowed you to query their XMPPP server for a username in order to respond including the uh email address. If you have the email address it would allow you to generate the user's login token. So you could then you know inject uh just do a replace through like burpuite or something and it would suddenly allow you to log in. They found administrators for this company on a bunch of their websites because they used a uh integrated uh authentication system. And so they were able to log in and now view all sorts of information [1:00:53] that should probably not be public because they were an administrator. Uh and they're having all sorts of fun uh reporting this right now. Um, like I said, there's this company was doing a lot of things right, but it was a very complicated thing that frankly, uh, uh, a lot of these companies need, excuse the term, need to get penetration tested. Uh, they need people to sit down and and poke at these things and see, can I string ABCD? Because once you get the Oops Top 10 out of the way, okay, now it's a little more esoteric. Can I stitch this little piece of information with this other piece over here and make something, you know, really bad? So, [1:01:34] it's still things like uh stored cookies, how are you generating tokens, are you sufficiently random? There also things like updated your freaking servers. A number of of times I've seen servers that just get forgotten. Oh, there was a really funny one where company made a big deal on their website. They were doing a lot of things right. They were doing the one-time use uh uh room uh uh URL uh thing and and had thought this through. Their legal department, you know, went over everything. They made a big deal saying, "Oh, yeah, and our ser server is located in the EU, meaning we're subject to GDPR, meaning we are, [1:02:16] you know, got high standards for security for for privacy." I'm like, "Okay, cool. Why is your server saying it's in Shenzhen, China? Yeah, they they they they forgot to migrate the server to the data center in the EU. And so they're like, "Ah, crap." And to their credit, they actually pulled the information about the the whole GDPR and EU thing off their website until they got the server actually migrated. [1:02:45] So they weren't, you know, they reacted very quickly and and realized the mistake. Yeah, it's little screw-ups like that that excuse the phrase catch them with their pants down. I see another hand there. Yeah, go ahead. Tell us so we can hear you. Otherwise, he can't hear you. What are the three top safest IoT sex toys? What are the top three IoT sex toys that are safe? That are safe. Sorry. Safe. I would still say Wee Vibe, uh, Levent devices and, uh, uh, any of the Kiru devices. K I R R O those are like the [1:03:26] big name players. They have a good check of the market share. Uh, I don't care much for like Wee Vibe, now Group or Wow Group because they don't necessarily like researchers. Um, they figure they can handle it themselves. But, uh, still they they do a lot of things right. and once bitten twice shy, they're they're quite uh uh you know, they dot their eyes across their tees as much as they possibly can. [1:03:54] But as with everything, there's always a chance. Yeah. Right. Any other? Yes, we have another one. Going what are like you mentioned the OS top 10. What are the biggest vulnerabilities uh that you're finding in these hardware and firmware? What's what are the top three top two? So, I haven't looked much at at firmware stuff. There was a talk at Defcon a number of years ago with the love ants uh butt plug that they found a very weird thing that if you were able to compromise the uh firmware update site you could actually and again this is the [1:04:36] thing when you're in this you stop noticing the innuendo and and jokes because they just there are so many of them you never be able to have a conversation you know if you you stop for every one of them. Uh but if you were able to backdoor the firmware on this thing, it was a case of the firmware could then infect the uh desktop client which would then spread through chat in the client. It was a remarkably uh uh brilliant uh hack, but so far outside of the chances of happening, I I'd never see it. [1:05:14] Um the the sorry what was the can you state the question again? Sure. Like what are the top vulnerabilities you're seeing in these devices? Um most of the time authentication authorization you know they'll add features to a thing and they forget to say you know do a check to say hey am I allowed to do this? Um again guessable passwords. I wish you could actually do have the option at least of doing like two-factor authentication on some of these apps. Um, most people probably wouldn't use it, but it'd be nice. Um, you know, uh, are they doing things like rate limiting to prevent [1:05:54] password stuffing? So, it's uh, uh, the bar has been raised significantly. Uh again, because it's not an area where it's really easy to make money off of it, there's not a huge number of attacks. Um but I'm waiting for the day when, you know, evidence from a hack of even the usernames or the the user emails of these things is used in like a divorce case or something to prove infidelity. [1:06:24] like it's it's you know data that could be salacious and depending on the sites because a lot of these devices could be used on many different sites some of them let's say the themes of them are a little more risque than others and so any association with that site could be very problematic do you believe Magnus Carlson used the butt plug to cheat oh god so I did Actually, I did a write up on the site about that and and basically made the point that in order to do that, so many things would have to [1:07:04] line up. It has been done on YouTube uh but in very controlled conditions. If you've ever seen like some of those chess championships, there's like a whole like press pen uh uh around them. And so somebody would have to be in like nearby in the audience doing that. uh uh you know getting the the moves in real time, figuring out what the counter move was, you know, sending the command through that and nobody would notice this like because they also delay the video streams uh uh by several minutes. There wouldn't have been a way to do it remotely, you know, over the internet [1:07:44] either. It just made for really good clickbait. And it's that whole story has been one of those like hitting desk things. It's just so stupid when you actually think about it. But there's that nugget that it could be possible and it's it's clickbait headlines is what it is. And just to be clear, it was not Magnus was no reason to cheat whatsoever in the greatest meeting. Sorry if you're a crack. Yeah. Sorry. So question here. [1:08:18] What uh what would you consider to be right now the hottest new protocol for innovation in the space? That's that's really exciting. New protocol innovation. Where's the where's the spirit? Uh well, so um the it's one of the things I'm I'm more interested in the technical details and the actual like usage and and and markets and and there's other sites that are all about that stuff. The most interesting one that I still need to dive into is um orgy mode where it's a a one to many and you can actually pass around control amongst the group. [1:09:01] So it's uh Loveance has this and it's where like a CAM model could uh control many people's devices all at once. Uh the other is uh you know again you have a bunch of people that sign up and control gets passed around for a period of time between them. So I don't know just highly interactive stuff should shall we say. hand. Try one more hand at a one of the jokes, but if these all get infected instead of being a botn net, would it be a buttnet? [1:09:34] Okay. Every once in a while, somebody comes up with a joke I haven't heard yet, and that is a good one. So, applause. It's yours. If it's a botn net, would it be a botnet? Yeah. Amazing. Okay. Does anyone have any I think that was the last question. Oh, one more. Okay. Maybe just um speak very quickly on what's where the innovation space is coming from. Are there open source protocols being worked on? You're driving this all proprietary product. [1:10:14] Do you know what? Take your hand up. Hi. Everyone chat with him after if you have questions. There's a project that they run called butplug.io, which is essentially open-source uh uh control for all these devices. So, you can integrate them with like games and other things. Wow, that's amazing. Well, we have a follow-up talk next time, I guess. And I I have to say it's nice to see a a bunch of old friends in the audience here. [1:10:55] Um makes you feel good. And I'm I'm sorry I couldn't be there uh to do this in person. I would have brought the bag of dongs with me, too, because I'm really thinking that crossing the border with that right now would be very entertaining. You're taking his carry-on. Well, let's all give Brenman a round of applause. are busy tonight. I do. And thank you, Renderman, for your your uh excellent talk. And we'll we'll chat more soon. [1:11:24] It's not, you know, germline, you know, gene sequencing or anything like that, but uh uh I think it's interesting. Amazing. I think you share. All right. Well, continue to chat with each other and uh thank you all for joining. Thank you. Good night. Thank let me just put some music on so people feel good. Feel good. [1:12:06] [Music] Okay, we're waiting for this. [Music] Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. It's naked fighter. [Music] Thank you, Render Man. I appreciate it. Um, that was amazing. Thank you so much. and well I'll send you a message later. What was it? Um I think people are sort of wrapping up but I I'll I'll send you a message in a second. Thank you so [Music] much. Lord [Music] know for I [1:13:35] want I see one. [Music] [Music] [Music] I got the [Music] sh Heat. [Music] Heat. Heat. Heat. [Music] [Applause] [Music] I knew [Applause] Now [Music] to feel [Music] No one can be love [Music] so [Music] for all. You keep on If you shall dance for everybody. Heat. [Music] Heat. Heat. [Music] Heat. Heat. Heat. [Music] Heat. Heat. [Music] [Applause] [Music] doing things like that. [Music] should follow my eyes on [1:17:21] you. You know I [Applause] my one day again I hope you know I'm show here and [Music] now every night searching for eternity. No gravity on me. I can't anymore. My feet won't touch the [Music] anymore. I have to eat [Music] them anymore. [Music] I'm in your truck. Open the [1:18:35] [Music] door. [Music] Tonight show I think it's time to go. My heart, my soul, my mind will lose control. I know you go to the everything that I [Music] you [Music] know I am drifting by the moon but I will see you soon in you. Every night I'm searching for eternity where there was new to me. I can't anymore. My touch [Music] anymore on a tree. I have to spend [1:20:10] 90. I can't anymore. I'm on [Music] [Applause] [Music] your way. [Music] Heat. [Music] [Music] Heat. Oh [Music] my god. [Music] [Music] Yeah. [Music] I know nothing but how come we don't know like me what the hell they fighting for a man when they're blaming us know you can't roll another rock you can't give up [1:21:56] [Music] alone in the [Music] Don't Oh god. [Music] I got you. [Music] [Music] about the future. Something [Music] [1:23:28] [Music] What is a better way? [Music] [Music] When I am [Music] my loyal [Music] Yeah. So now I'm like [Music] it's okay. Yeah. Wonder. [Music] [Music] [Music] Sakill. [Music] [Music] Hey, we lo people. [Music] as the [Music] song [Music] it me. [Music] You better be a [Music] little te. All right, I got to [Music] get [Music] foreign. Say whatever. [Music] Say what's [Music] [1:28:39] [Music] Let's get to [Music] be scared to be done. Let's get to be good. If there was [Music] enough Heat. Heat. [Music] Say the master. [Music] [1:30:03] [Music] [1:30:21] [Music] single wherever. [Music] single [Music] night. Let's give [Music] me Heat. Heat. [Music] Hallelujah. [Music] [Music] That's all I want to be. Your thoughts will show my heart for you. It's true. I count when I was feeling. So let's get down to I will be the first [Music] inv. So let's get back to the one I need up now. So let's just wait. The one I need is tied up right [1:32:43] now. So let's don't draw the lines cuz I can't make my mind right now. So let's just wait a while. the one I need. I don't know. [Music] I will be the first to open up so I don't I will be the first to open up so I don't want to give you [Music] are. So let's get round to the one I need right now. So let's just wait a [1:33:54] while. The one I need is tied up right now. So let's not draw the line cuz I can't make my mind right now. [Music] So let's just play the what I need. It's all intended but all in vain. It's what I b on my side. [Music] I pause there. It's all the same. So, let's get down to [Music] the one I need up right now. So, let's just wait a [1:35:22] while. The one I need is tied up right now. [Music] I [Music] believe [Music] Foreign speech. Foreign speech. Foreign speech. [Music] [Applause] [Music] over. [Music] Keep pass. [Music] So [Music] [Music] shadow comes [Music] [Applause] [Music] Fore! [Music] Heat. Heat. [Music] [1:38:31] Merry Christmas. [1:38:41] [Music] [Music] [1:39:03] All the way [Music] [1:39:24] C2 [Music] We just [Music]